The core of the European Commission’s proposal is to require providers of communication services such as messengers (e.g., WhatsApp, Signal, Threema), email providers, and social networks to systematically and automatically scan their platforms for illegal content. At the request of a judicial authority, these services would be required to scan the private and previously confidential communications of their users. This applies in particular to:

• Images and videos: Automated scanning for known depictions of child abuse.
• Links: Checking shared URLs.
• Text messages and audio: Detection of patterns indicative of “Grooming“, i.e., the deliberate initiation of sexual contact with children.

To make this technically possible, the currently widespread and considered secure end-to-end encryption would have to be weakened. This encryption ensures that only the sender and recipient of a message can read its content – ​​not even the service provider itself.

The main argument for chat monitoring is the protection of children. Proponents, including the EU Commission and several child protection organizations, argue that the voluntary measures taken by major platforms are insufficient to control the flood of child abuse material. Perpetrators deliberately use encrypted services to remain undetected. A legal obligation to scan is therefore necessary in order to:

• Uncover crimes and secure evidence.
• Prosecute perpetrators more effectively and dismantle networks.
• Protect children preventively by identifying grooming attempts early on.

They emphasize that this does not involve indiscriminate human monitoring, but rather an automated comparison with databases of known illegal content.

Resistance to chat monitoring is enormous and comes from a wide range of sectors of society. Civil rights organizations, data protection advocates, IT security experts, business associations, academics, and even the German Child Protection Association are issuing urgent warnings about the consequences of the law.

The main points of criticism are:

• Violation of fundamental rights: Scanning all private messages without cause constitutes a massive infringement on the fundamental right to privacy and the constitutionally protected confidentiality of telecommunications (digital secrecy) in Germany. Every citizen would be placed under general suspicion.
• Risk of mass surveillance: The technology would create an infrastructure for monitoring the entire population. Once established, it could easily be misused for prosecuting other crimes or suppressing political opinions.
• Circuiting secure encryption: To scan content, end-to-end encryption would have to be circumvented through “backdoors” or so-called “client-side scanning” (scanning content directly on the user’s device before encryption). Experts warn that such vulnerabilities could inevitably be exploited by criminals and foreign intelligence agencies, massively endangering the security of all users.
• High susceptibility to errors: The algorithms used are not error-free. There is a risk of “false positives,” where completely harmless content (e.g., vacation photos of one’s own children on the beach) is incorrectly flagged as suspicious. This could lead to innocent citizens being targeted by law enforcement.
• Counterproductive to child protection: Even the German Child Protection Association argues that children and young people need safe and confidential communication spaces to, for example, talk about experiences of abuse or seek help. Chat monitoring would destroy these safe spaces.

Prominent messaging services like Signal have already announced that they would rather withdraw their service from the EU than compromise the security and confidentiality of their users.

The legislative process at the EU level has stalled. For the regulation to enter into force, the Council of the EU Member States and the European Parliament must agree on a common text.

• European Parliament: Parliament already agreed on a position in November 2023 that significantly softens the Commission’s original proposal. It opposed the indiscriminate scanning of private, encrypted communications and wants to limit surveillance to known illegal content and only upon a court order.
• Council of the EU Member States: Reaching an agreement here is proving considerably more difficult. A crucial vote by the EU member states, originally scheduled for early October 2025, was postponed because a qualified majority for the current proposal was not apparent.
• Germany’s Position: After much hesitation, the German government has clearly positioned itself against indiscriminate chat monitoring. Both Justice Minister Marco Buschmann (FDP) and Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) reject the mass scanning of private communications. Since Germany’s voice carries considerable weight as the EU’s most populous country, a majority for the current draft is currently blocked.

However, the issue is not settled. Negotiations continue, and a compromise is being sought. The debate on how to guarantee effective child protection without compromising fundamental civil rights will continue to be a major focus of European politics.

The debate surrounding EU chat monitoring is a prime example of the conflict between security and freedom in the digital age. While the goal of protecting children from sexual abuse is universally agreed upon, opinions diverge widely regarding the proportionality and effectiveness of the proposed measures.

Critics argue that instead of mass surveillance, law enforcement agencies should be strengthened with more personnel and better technical equipment, and that there should be a greater focus on prevention and media literacy. The coming months will reveal whether the EU can find a way to protect children without undermining the cornerstones of a free and democratic society—namely, private and confidential communication.